Revising military doctrine: Why states adapt to armed groups threats despite conventional superiority? The Case of Israeli Military Doctrine Adapting to Asymmetric Threats from Hamas (2008 –2023)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63939/JSMS.2025-Vol8.N29.175-194الكلمات المفتاحية:
Military doctrine; Decisive component; Asymmetric warfare; Palestinian resistance; Israel; Gaza Stripالملخص
Why do states adapt to threats posed by non-state armed groups armed Groups’ actors despite their conventional military superiority? This study examines the review of Israel’s military doctrine between 2008 and 2023, with a focus on the decisive component as a central element, despite the state’s overwhelming conventional and technological superiority. The research examines the impact of asymmetric threats, particularly those posed by Hamas, on the development of Israel’s ability to make rapid and decisive decisions and achieve clear outcomes in conflicts. The study relies on a comprehensive analysis of official Israeli military and security documents to identify the mechanisms linking asymmetric threats to the review of the decisiveness component within the military doctrine. The findings indicate a shift from reliance on deterrence and preemptive strikes toward concepts of active defense and conflict management between wars, accompanied by an enhanced capacity for decisiveness in military operations. This transformation reflects a dynamic strategic adaptation to a changing and asymmetric security environment, rather than a weakness in Israel’s military or technological capabilities.








